User:DerrickWang2023/sandbox

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Self-Censorship in China[edit]

Self-censorship (simplified Chinese: 自我审查 traditional Chinese:自我審查) in China refers to the practice of people or organizations choosing to voluntarily limit their own expression in the media, academic fields, and the corporate world, to comply with the strict regulations of the Chinese government and to avoid potential consequences.[1] Self-censorship occurs in various facets of everyday life for citizens, including on platforms, within news reporting, in education and academia, and even among foreign businesses operating in China.

Social Media[edit]

Self-censorship is common on social media platforms in China. A study targeting Weibo revealed that 90.4% of users engage in some form of self-censorship.[2] The main reasons for this include bypassing censorship to post content, avoiding account suspension, and eluding police summons.[2] One common technique to evade keyword-based censorship is the use of word variants, or morphs[2]. For example, netizens might refer to the supreme leader Xi Jinping (习近平, pinyin: xī jìn píng) as "narrow-neck bottle" (细颈瓶, pinyin: xì jǐng píng) because their pronunciations in Mandarin are consistent.[3]There are many similar examples, such as referring to the 1989 Tiananmen protest "June 4th Incident" as "May 35th";[4] mentioning the "Henan banks" (河南银行, pinyin: hé nán yín háng), which are associated with financial corruption, by using the term "Netherland Bank" (荷兰银行, pinyin: hé lán yín háng).[5] On July 13, 2022, the Chinese microblogging platform Weibo announced a crackdown on the use of homophonic and variant characters, prohibiting such violations.[6]

Social Media in Hong Kong[edit]

Since the enactment of the National Security Law (NSL), the environment for freedom of expression in Hong Kong has deteriorated significantly. Within six months following the implementation of the law, Hong Kong law enforcement arrested at least 100 individuals for violations related to the NSL, with at least 24 charged for expressing "seditious" and "secessionist" sentiments.[7] To avoid breaching the NSL, the number of Hong Kong residents engaging in self-censorship on social media has markedly increased. A study indicates that after the NSL came into effect, Twitter users in Hong Kong were 333% more likely to delete their accounts and 247% more likely to remove their past posts compared to the average user.[8]

Media[edit]

Media self-censorship refers to the non-coercive actions taken by media organizations to avoid offending power holders such as governments, advertisers, and major commercial enterprises.[9] The Chinese media exercises self-censorship by altering the tone of reporting, preserving the main content but omitting certain details, and quoting official discourse.[10] Self-censorship mechanisms help media navigate around topics that are not allowed for public discussion, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of publishing highly politically sensitive content[11].

Media in Hong Kong[edit]

In Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, although the mainland authorities did not impose their censorship mechanisms on Hong Kong, intervention occurred through the acquisition of media, including broadcasting and newspapers, by pro-China capitalists.[12][8] Notable examples include the acquisition of Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB) and the South China Morning Post by businessmen with close ties to Beijing.[13]

Despite Hong Kong journalists being considered to uphold a sense of professional consciousness and liberal values post-handover,[14] forced self-censorship is still frequent.[9] Since the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, the degree of press freedom has sharply declined. In 2022, the Hong Kong Journalists Association's latest "Press Freedom Index" dropped to 26.2 points, the lowest since the surveys began[15]. Hong Kong journalist Zhang Shan voluntarily filters out topics that may touch on the National Security Law and no longer actively seeks opportunities to report on sensitive issues. This is due to concerns arising from the arrest of journalists and editors from "Apple Daily" and "Stand News".[15]

Education and Academia[edit]

Self-censorship is also a common phenomenon in China's education system. The Chinese Communist Party has tight control over scholars and educators to ensure their teachings and written works adhere to state-approved ideologies.[16]

Scholars conducting research in China voluntarily limit their discussions to avoid redlining by the Chinese Communist Party. Scholars who choose to proceed with their research regardless of its sensitivity face repercussions such as visa difficulties, meetings with government authorities (commonly referred to as being "invited to tea"), and denial to access archival documents.[17]

Even in the scientific and technological areas, scholars are expected to conform to the Party's ideology. The "Seven Prohibitions'' list highlights how strictly self-censorship is enforced; it forbids discussions of subjects like democracy and human rights in research and instructional settings. Thus, there is very little room for criticism in China's strictly controlled environment. Even though some researchers pursue their studies secretly or find safety in less restrictive regions, self-censorship remains a significant issue for academics seeking intellectual freedom.[18] The role of students in this is also essential because there are times when government officials are not the ones who monitor, but instead, students report on their teachers or professors.[19] Therefore, educators willingly restrict their insights about specific issues in classrooms, fearing students might report them because of their ideological differences.[20]

For example, Confucius Institutes are programs that promote education and culture in China, and they are often seen as potentially restrictive tools that limit academic independence.[21] These institutes also have "proscribed topics" that are under tight control by the government. The restrictive topics include Dalai Lama, Taiwan, Tibet, and China's military and political activities. The fear of offending the Confucius institutes and losing financial backing leads academics to self-censor their work[21].

International Academics[edit]

Self-censorship is also a concern in international academic collaboration. Due to the enactment of the NSL, many universities outside of China are also adopting various measures to reduce the potential risks of facing scrutiny by the Chinese government.[22] To safeguard academic freedom and to mitigate the need for self-censorship, students are now allowed to make anonymous submissions when discussing sensitive topics about China, and they are prohibited from sharing any class content with outsiders.[22] Many universities from all over the world value their collaborations with their Chinese partners and thus are more likely to engage in self-censorship.[23] The opportunities and the resources offered by their Chinese counterparts provide a strong incentive to maintain their positive connections.[24] Consequently, academic institutions are now more cautious when choosing donors to ensure that their academic expression is not compromised due to financial backing.

Corporate Self-censorship[edit]

Foreign companies operating in China navigate an increasingly complex landscape where economic opportunities co-exist with strict political conditionality.[25][26] China has long leveraged its significant economic power for political purposes, making “self-censorship a non-negotiable legal requirement” to operate in China.[27][28] By threatening companies with exclusion from the lucrative Chinese market for not toeing the party line, foreign companies often become indirect messengers of the CCP’s political ideology through self-censorship.[29][30]

Examples:[edit]

Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has “sporadically” pressured companies to adhere to CCP ideology[xxxviii]. For instance, in 1996, Martin Scorsese’s biographical film about the 14th Dalai Lama triggered a ban on Disney in China, only ending in 1999 following Disney’s CEO publicly stating the movie was a “mistake” and they would “prevent this sort of thing from happening” . Some see this moment as the start of China’s “iron grip” on Hollywood’s and its self-censorship.[31][32]

More recently, in 2016, Xi Jinping’s government initiated a more extensive crackdown on foreign companies operating in China[30]. In 2018, several global airlines, including British Airways, United, American Airlines and Lufthansa, altered their labelling of Taiwan as a separate country from China conforming to the One-China principle; as of May 2020, 39 global airlines have done this.[33][34] In the same year, international hotel chains Marriott and InterContinental also changed Taiwan to be represented as a part of China.[35][36] Gap removed shirts from stores in Canada which displayed a map of China without Taiwan, highlighting how corporate self-censorship to access Chinese markets transcends China's borders.[37][38]

Following the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition protests, there was a drastic rise in repression of foreign companies and self-censorship.[30] In 2019, Blizzard Entertainment removed a player for reciting a Hong Kong protest slogan and two American players for holding up a sign supporting Hong Kong, claiming players cannot “offend the public” [39]. Following a public dispute between the NBA and China over Daryl Morey’s tweet in support of Hong Kong,[40] ESPN issued an internal memo forbidding “political discussion” and requested discussion remain on basketball.[41]

The actions of American tech company Apple offer an emblematic example of how far foreign companies are willing to self-censor to maintain access to the Chinese market.[42][28] Apple has relinquished access to VPN’s and removed foreign news outlets from China’s app store,[43] warned creators on its Apple TV+ platform to refrain from representing China negatively,[44] moved China’s iCloud data storage to mainland China,[45] created a mechanism to proactively remove apps which trigger government censors,[46] and removed a Hong Kong protest map app used to avoid locations that were tear-gassed.[47]  

Other examples of corporate self-censorship by companies operating in China include Google,[48] Lancome,[49] Mercedes-Benz,[50] Lecia,[51] YouTube,[52] Cathay Pacific,[53] Microsoft.[48]

Notable Cases of Self-censorship[edit]

Doctor Strange:[edit]

In the comic book, The Ancient One, the Sorcerer Supreme, as well as the mentor of Doctor Strange, is a Tibetan monk. Being an “autonomous region” claimed by mainland China, Tibet is a region with a complex history due to the foremost leader of major schools of local Buddhism (or Tibetan Buddhism), the Dalai Lama, who has been seeking independence of the region, according to China. In this case, to avoid such a Tibetan religious leader figure being politically sensitive, the Scottish actress Tilda Swinton was chosen to be cast as The Ancient One, and the location Kamar-Taj, the fictional place where the protagonists and other monks live, was thus shifted from Tibet to Kathmandu, Nepal to avoid censorship by the Chinese authority.[54] In this way, the film could successfully enter China, one of the largest box office markets, and future films

Everything Everywhere All at Once[edit]

The 2022 sci-fi film starred Michelle Yeoh, who won Best Actress in a Leading Role at the 95th Academy Awards, as Evelyn Wang, a Chinese immigrant who had an insane and inter-dimensional adventure. Although the film is still not on in mainland China, Wenhui Daily, a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party has reported its achievement at the Oscars. A news report from Wenhui Daily described Joy Wang, Evelyn’s daughter portrayed by Stephanie Hsu who won Best Actress in a Supporting Role, as a “daughter with a westernised lifestyle” (“生活西化的女儿”) .[55] This euphemism might be a result of her homosexual identity, which is a controversial topic in China. The newspaper refrains from stating anything explicitly about Joy’s homosexuality to ensure they adhere to “proper language” considering the discourse in China.[56]

Zhihu and The Constitutional Amendment:[edit]

In the year 2018, The NPC approved a constitutional amendment to abolish the fixed term limit of the president suggesting that President Xi Jinping can remain in office indefinitely, unlike his predecessors who were bound to the limit of two consecutive 5-year terms.[57] Regarding Xi’s indefinite presidential terms, words and phrases including “‘indefinite rule,’ ‘emperor’ and ‘Winnie the Pooh’ (a cartoon figure often said to resemble the president) were removed from Zhihu, a Shinese alternative to Quora[58]. Through keyword filtering, especially in discussions on political events, Zhihu follows censorship laws in China to avoid penalties from regulatory bodies, as well as damage to their public image since companies in China are expected to take on their social responsibility, including enforcing censorship to demonstrate that they are a law-abiding body.

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